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CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR BY 
ELITE DECISION-MAKERS 
SYMPOSIUM 
 Perspectives from Law and Social 
Psychology 
Introduction* 
James A. Fanto† 
Here it is, almost three years after the fall of Enron, and 
the trials of some of the top executives involved in the 
corporate scandals are still proceeding or yet to begin. All too 
often the same pattern emerges. Significant senior executives, 
like a company’s chief financial officer (CFO) and underlings, 
plead guilty to the misdeeds that brought down a firm and then 
act as government witnesses against the chief executive officer 
(CEO). The CEO resists vigorously, with the best defense 
counsel that money can buy, alleging that the scandal was 
solely the work of the CFO and his unscrupulous cohorts. In 
each scandal, the debate in the courtroom and the business 
press is about who is the individual ultimately responsible for 
the scandal. Generally, if a group is singled out in the 
discussion at all, it is the corporation’s board of directors. But 
the board is not regarded as central to the scandal, except in a 
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kind of negative manner, as being too inactive and indifferent 
in its oversight to have detected the misbehavior. 
Examples abound. The drama of the responsibility for 
WorldCom’s demise has just played out in court in a trial 
pitting its former CEO Bernie Ebbers (who was found guilty on 
numerous charges) against its former CFO Scott Sullivan (who 
has already pleaded guilty to securities fraud) as the prime 
mover in the fraud.1 In another courtroom, former HealthSouth 
CEO Richard Scrushy is defending himself against fraud 
charges, with the chief opposing witnesses being the former 
CFOs (who all have pleaded guilty to securities fraud).2 
Kenneth Lay, former Chairman and CEO, and Jeffrey Skilling, 
former CEO, of Enron, have yet to come to trial.3 Arrayed 
against them will be the notorious Andrew Fastow, former 
CFO, and a host of lesser executives, who have all entered into 
plea agreements with the government. For the most part, board 
members of these companies (other than inside board 
members) have not been criminally charged, but are the subject 
of civil suits on account of their inattention that allowed the 
scandals to go on for so long.4 
It is no surprise that the criminal trials are proceeding 
in this way, given that our criminal law and justice system are 
designed to determine an individual’s guilt. Nor is it a surprise 
that the business media, which is in many cases really only a 
step up from the tabloids, strives to gain and maintain readers 
by emphasizing the personal stories behind the corporate 
scandals. Both of these reactions to the scandals reveal a 
fundamental human tendency to attribute complex misdeeds to 
individuals.5 This is the “bad apples” understanding of the 
corporate scandals or problems. This attribution error applies 
to complex positive outcomes as well.6 For example, the 
  
 1 One can follow this saga in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. See, e.g., 
Almar Latour, et al., Ebbers is Convicted in Massive Fraud, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005, 
at A1. 
 2 See, e.g., Dan Morse & Evelina Shmukler, HealthSouth Ex-Treasurer Says 
He Found Fraud, Told Scrushy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at C4. 
 3 See Start of Enron Trial Is Set for January ’06, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2005, 
at C2. 
 4 See, e.g., Settlement Motion, In re Enron Corp., et al. (No. 01-16034 (AJG) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2005)) (discussing settlement with outside directors of 
Enron). 
 5 This erroneous reasoning seems to be based on a general human tendency 
to simplify causation. See generally ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169-94 (2d ed. 
1986) (discussing this human cognitive mistake). 
 6 See generally NASSIM N. TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS (2001) 
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business media is only too ready to lionize corporate executives 
for the achievement of their firms: one has only to go back to 
the late 1990s to find article after article extolling Kenneth Lay 
and Bernie Ebbers. This is not to say that individuals matter 
for nothing in scandals or in success. But to focus on 
individuals blinds us to the complex causes of misbehavior (to 
consider the focus of this conference) and keeps us from making 
reforms that could prevent the recurrence of this misbehavior. 
The principal purpose of the conference, “Corporate 
Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers: Perspectives from Law 
and Social Psychology,” is to offer an alternative to the 
understanding that corporate misconduct and scandals are due 
to the work of a few “bad apples” among corporate executives 
and directors. From information available on the scandals, it 
appeared that inner circles of top executives, corporate advisors 
(accountants, bankers and lawyers) and board members formed 
coherent social structures that engaged in illegal or unethical 
behavior that destroyed firm value.7 A possible determinant of 
the scandals, in other words, was group, not individual, 
behavior. If this was the case, a number of interesting 
questions are posed and research avenues opened that could 
have important consequences for legal policy-making. What is 
perverse group behavior and what distinguishes it from 
positive group behavior? How did this group misbehavior arise 
in so many publicly-traded firms, which suggests that 
corporate governance structure contributed to it? How could 
individual members of these circles or groups engage in 
behavior that, on some levels, they knew was improper, but 
nevertheless accepted from a group perspective? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to turn to the 
social sciences, for one of the goals of social psychology and 
organizational theory is to understand and explain group 
behavior, including deviant group behavior. My co-organizer, 
Professor Larry Solan,8 and I thought that it would be useful to 
ask what researchers in these human sciences could tell legal 
scholars about the social psychological and other organizational 
causes of the corporate elite’s misbehavior. We decided that the 
  
(discussing tendency of individuals to take credit for random positive outcomes). 
 7 I develop this argument in greater detail in my article, Whistleblowing and 
the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OREGON L. REV. 435 (2004). 
 8 Director of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for the Study of Law, Language 
and Cognition, which sponsored the conference together with the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation. 
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best way to achieve this purpose was to bring together at a 
conference prominent social psychologists and organizational 
and management specialists to present and to discuss their 
theories and research about group misbehavior that could help 
explain the corporate scandals. We planned to have corporate 
law scholars, as discussants, comment upon the implications of 
these findings and research for policy making on the legal 
regulation of corporate governance and decision-making. 
One goal of the conference was pragmatic: to find 
solutions to the misconduct of elite corporate decision makers 
from a social science perspective that legal policy makers, 
fixated on individuals as primary causes of the scandals, had 
overlooked. Yet the dialogue of conference participants was not 
addressed directly to policy makers as such, and it would have 
that pragmatic effect indirectly by contributing to a new 
direction in corporate legal scholarship. A complementary goal 
was then to stimulate and promote interactions and research 
between social psychologists and organizational theorists, on 
the one hand, and corporate scholars, on the other. 
These interactions and possible joint research would 
help correct a tendency in the dominant direction of current 
corporate law scholarship to ignore group causes of corporate 
governance problems, which tendency has led to reforms that 
can only incompletely prevent corporate misbehavior. So much 
of this scholarship is grounded in the law and economics 
tradition that bases its policy prescriptions upon rational, self-
interested economic actors.9 When faced with the corporate 
scandals, scholars in this tradition react in ways not unlike 
business reporters, members of Congress or federal 
prosecutors: they focus on the individual. For example, if a 
CEO, like Dennis Kozlowski, took too many benefits from his 
former company, Tyco International, it was because 
appropriately designed incentives had not been in place for all 
the corporate actors involved: his compensation package was 
not correctly keyed to his performance, and the members of the 
Tyco’s board did not have adequate personal incentives to 
check his natural self-interested behavior. From this 
  
 9 There have been notable exceptions. We were fortunate to have at our 
conference as discussants, Donald Langevoort and Lynne Dallas, two legal scholars 
who have for some time used social science methods and research in their analysis of 
corporate and securities law issues and problems. 
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perspective, corporate scandals can be addressed only by 
reforms aimed at these individuals.10 
Our focus in this conference, as would be our focus in 
the resulting research, is different. For us, individual behavior 
within groups can be understood as determined by group 
dynamics. This means more than that an individual is 
conscious of and affected by others, although this is certainly a 
part of the analysis. It is, rather, an account of how individuals 
as group members assume a social or group identity, which in 
turn influences their behavior when they are in the group. The 
influence comes when the group identity defines, among other 
things, the roles and appropriate behavior for individuals 
within the group. The study of group dynamics examines the 
formation of this group identity and the way in which it shapes 
thought, perception and behavior. The study should explain 
how groups with perverse purposes can form and how 
individuals participate in them and come to find their actions 
within the group entirely natural and proper, even though 
when viewed from a perspective outside the group, the 
individuals acknowledge them to be completely improper. 
To encourage discussion as to the group nature of the 
misbehavior in the corporate scandals, we asked conference 
participants to consider the following related questions in 
making their presentations and preparing their articles: 
1. Do corporate scandals reveal problems of group 
misbehavior among corporate elite decision-makers and 
advisors? Can social psychology and organizational theory help 
us identify the nature and causes of the problems? 
2. Are there differences between the ways that people 
perceive themselves as individuals on the one hand and as 
members of groups on the other that can explain, at least in 
part, corporate misconduct? 
3. Can corporate reformers do anything about these 
problems? Can social psychology and related human sciences 
offer reformers any guidance? In this connection, significant 
reforms aimed at elite corporate decision-makers and advisors 
have already occurred. From a social psychological perspective, 
how well-designed are they to address the group problems and 
how effective are they likely to be? 
  
 10 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We 
Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (ECGI, Working Paper No. 
44/2004, July 2004). 
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We think that each of the articles in this volume 
answers one or several of the above questions and together the 
articles represent the work that we wanted to foster and to 
share with a wide scholarly audience. 
In his article, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of 
Contagious Organizational Corruption, Professor of Psychology 
John Darley appropriately begins the volume with a focus on 
the first group of questions by taking issue with the “bad 
apples” theory of corporate corruption, which, in his view, 
allows people to ignore the complex causes of corruption in 
corporations and other organizations. These causes include the 
phenomenon that Professor Darley has identified in his 
previous work: that corruption begins gradually, often with a 
small act that is morally ambiguous or barely improper, and 
proceeds by small steps until the corruption is monumental. 
This gradual descent into the immoral helps explain why so 
many ordinary individuals can participate in corruption. In a 
related point, Professor Darley observes that the acts leading to 
corporate corruption are the product not of moral deliberation 
but of quick, intuitive judgments, and these judgments are 
inherently self-interested (either for the individual, the group 
or both). He then discusses how these corrupt, self-interested 
acts spread or are imitated in an organization. This 
propagation occurs because those who are disturbed by the acts 
feel pressured to remain silent since the organization sends the 
message that the acts are acceptable. Even more significantly 
for the purposes of the conference, Professor Darley points out 
that group loyalty prevents employees from complaining about 
the progressively corrupt practices. The foundations of this 
loyalty, as discussed in more detail by Professor Hogg in his 
article, lie in an individual’s self-identification with the group, 
which transforms him or her into a group member with the 
group’s values. 
The article, Out of Touch: The CEO’s Role in Corporate 
Misbehavior, by Professor of Organizational Behavior Linda 
Treviño, appropriately follows Professor Darley’s, because she 
argues that a CEO of a firm is critical for the development of 
its ethical culture, which can help prevent scandals and 
abuses. For her, the importance of the CEO appears first in the 
design and implementation of a firm ethics program: is it 
window dressing, or is the program formal, value-oriented and 
integrated into the life of the firm? These latter attributes 
make the ethics program effective, i.e., make employees more 
likely to behave ethically and report ethical violations because 
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they feel that ethics matters to the firm and the firm will 
support them and will punish ethical violators. She observes 
that the CEO must also foster an ethical culture informally, for 
the CEO’s everyday behavior (which employees observe) 
reinforces the firm’s formal systems. The CEO does this by 
providing a visible example of a moral individual (one who 
personally cares about ethics) and a moral manager (one who 
shows in his or her management that ethics matters). Professor 
Treviño further argues that leaders must make their ethical 
decisions visible, provided that they are otherwise ethical 
persons and not hypocrites, because, unfortunately, there is a 
large social distance between the CEO and most employees. 
Professor Treviño then uses this distance also to explain why 
many CEOs fail to understand the ethical problems in their 
organization. Situated at the top of the firm, insulated from 
much of its activities and yet personally identified with it, a 
CEO cannot see many of its ethical problems and tends to 
adopt a rosy view of the organization. She also points out that 
because CEOs socialize almost exclusively with others of 
similar status they are unaware of issues and problems at the 
ordinary employee level. 
Then, in his comment on Professor Darley’s and 
Professor Treviño’s articles, entitled Discussing Corporate 
Misbehavior, Professor of Law Daniel Greenwood points to the 
disturbing outcome in U.S. corporate law: the narrowing of the 
purposes of the large complex organization, that is the public 
corporation, to a maximization of shareholder wealth. He 
insightfully observes that, while enormous CEO pay has been 
justified by the need to motivate self-interested individuals to 
perform well, CEOs state that they have little connection to 
and awareness of the enterprise whenever they are accused of 
being responsible for a scandal. The outsized CEO 
compensation, he contends, thus has no justification in light of 
the CEO’s great distance from other employees, especially 
since, as Professor Treviño shows, the CEO’s example and 
connection with the firm are critical to the development of its 
ethical culture. Commenting on Professor Darley’s article, 
Professor Greenwood emphasizes how it underscores the 
weakness of a corporate law that ignores the organizational 
complexity of firms. For Professor Greenwood, employees’ 
pursuit of organizational goals and purposes, which, according 
to Darley, lead them into scandals, points to a contradiction 
lying at the heart of firms: the good for which individuals are 
asked to sacrifice their time and even their liberty is only the 
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self-interest of the firm, which is an impoverished parody of 
morality and of the value of the common good and which, 
paradoxically, ends up driving the firm out of business. 
Professor Greenwood concludes his comment by setting forth 
broad ideas for reforms that might reintroduce values into 
corporate law debates. 
Professor of Social Psychology Michael Hogg squarely 
addresses, in his article, Social Identity and Misuse of Power: 
The Dark Side of Leadership, the second conference question 
(Are there differences in social and individual self-
conceptions?) by using social identity theory (of which he is a 
major exponent) to explain group features that could have led 
to the corporate scandals. Professor Hogg initially sets forth 
the basics of social identity theory, which explains how 
individuals categorize others and themselves in terms of their 
identity in significant groups (such as work groups), i.e., they 
“depersonalize” themselves and others in their group 
membership. He then describes how leadership makes sense in 
this theory: a leader is a prototypical member of a group, yet 
also with the ability to experiment in his or her behavior so as 
to lead the group in new directions (a member with 
“charisma”). But this account points to potential group 
problems. As Professor Hogg explains, if group norms defining 
group and individual member behavior do not include ethics, 
then group members, especially leaders, are likely to act 
unethically as part of the group. Moreover, given the deference 
of group members, the leader can move the group gradually 
towards unethical behavior. Indeed, as he explains, the leader 
can even use his or her status to begin to isolate himself or 
herself and a small coterie from the rest of the group (as 
demonstrated by CEOs in many scandal-ridden firms). 
Professor Hogg then introduces another important aspect of 
social identity theory, a group’s reduction of uncertainty, to 
explain unethical corporate behavior. He outlines a situation 
that can lead to scandals: individuals in corporations form 
groups with strong social identity and with powerful leaders 
because of the uncertainty of competitive corporate life. The 
leader and his or her minions may, in turn, become isolated in 
the organization and, if unchecked, they may lead it into 
corruption and disaster. 
In their co-written piece, Professor of Organizational 
Behavior Rakesh Khurana and graduate student Katharina 
Pick pose the individual vs. the group problem in contending 
that a board of directors cannot be understood only as a 
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collection of individuals. They first survey the understanding of 
the board under the dominant agency theory as a collection of 
individuals contracting with the firm and argue that the 
agency perspective does not capture the experience of board 
members or the facts about the corporate scandals. (But they 
warn that agency theory may create boardroom reality by 
encouraging board members to think of themselves as only self-
interested individuals.) In an approach similar to those of 
Professor Darley and Hogg, they then discuss the social 
attributes of boards that make them similar to other groups 
and that may have led to the scandals. Boards act cohesively 
pursuant to well understood group norms, but, as Khurana and 
Pick explain, these norms can prevent directors from 
questioning critically CEOs and other senior executives, which 
would have revealed problems in firms. They also point out 
that board norms are long lasting and difficult to change, and 
that these norms reinforce board members’ conformity to the 
group’s perspective and generally discourage dissent of any 
kind. The passivity is understandable in situations of 
uncertainty, which is usually that of a board, where experts, 
such as senior executives, offer authoritative views and where 
non-expert board members are discouraged from ever becoming 
active in raising issues. Khurana and Pick make the 
interesting additional observation that board norms of one firm 
are often similar to the norms of other firms, since board 
members constitute a small, closed population in U.S. society. 
Moreover, the authors observe that, like all groups, boards 
have developed routines for dealing with their tasks, which 
routines, occasionally, enable them to overlook critical issues 
and information (such as the Enron board’s routine approval of 
conflict of interest transactions). Khurana and Pick conclude 
their article, however, with an optimistic observation about the 
social nature of boards: increasingly norms of professionalism 
for board members are being developed, which may improve 
overall board performance and board norms. 
In a response to the third set of questions about the 
contribution of the social sciences to corporate reform, 
Professor of Psychology Tom Tyler poses the question how 
businesses with well-meaning executives can achieve employee 
compliance with laws and ethical norms. At the beginning of 
his article, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule 
Following in Work Settings: The Value of Self-regulatory 
Approaches, he contrasts two methods of firm ethical 
governance: the “command and control” model, which relies on 
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external sanctions and rewards, with the “self-regulatory” 
model, which relies on internal employee motivations. 
Professor Tyler points out that businesses have traditionally 
used the “command and control” model, which ensures 
compliance with policies through incentives and sanctions but 
which is costly and not particularly effective. The self-
regulatory model, on the other hand, ensures compliance by 
activating in work settings employees’ own ethical values, 
which in turn legitimates the organization’s values and rules. 
Professor Tyler discusses the empirical support for the self-
regulatory model, which also demonstrates its utility and 
effectiveness in business settings. He next explains that a firm 
can best activate employees’ ethical values by having 
employees perceive that fair procedures are used in firm 
decision-making and other workplace events. His message here 
is that employees feel comfortable about working for an 
organization and find its rules to be legitimate if they perceive 
that it treats them fairly. This finding gives companies a clear 
guideline: if they want employees to comply with a company’s 
rules and otherwise to act ethically, the company must 
establish fair procedures for workplace decisions. This raises 
the question of what constitutes a fair procedure, and Professor 
Tyler offers definitions and examples involving four important 
procedural components: the quality of decision-making, the 
quality of peoples’ treatment by organizational authorities, the 
rules of the organization and an employee’s experience with a 
supervisor(s). 
In his article, Structural Holes, CEOs, and 
Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate 
Governance, Professor of Law Lawrence Mitchell argues that 
the reform focus of improving the independence and monitoring 
ability of corporate boards misses an important origin of the 
corporate scandals in the power of CEOs and other senior 
executives. To explain this power, Professor Mitchell uses the 
theory of “structural holes” from economic sociology, which 
posits gaps between networks of individuals and groups and 
the importance and advantages that accrue to people who can 
fill the gaps. Unlike classical economics, the theory sees the 
actor as a social creature, i.e., a part of various social networks. 
After discussing the theory and situating it in economic and 
sociological discourse, he uses it to point to the gaps in the 
governance of public corporations that corporate actors can use 
opportunistically and that reforms should (but don’t) address. 
For Professor Mitchell, the theory suggests that the current 
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effort to control CEO power by emphasizing boards with 
independent directors may have the opposite result, for in 
firms with these boards the CEO alone would fill the structural 
holes of information about the corporation for the directors (as 
opposed to the situation of a board with inside directors who 
would be part of other informational networks in the 
corporation). Even more interestingly, Professor Mitchell uses 
the theory to explain scandals involving senior executives, 
other than the CEO, because the CEO, consciously or not, may 
allow structural holes to develop beneath him in the 
organization, which are filled by senior executives who could 
engage in unscrupulous behavior (if so inclined) and which give 
the CEO “deniability.” Professor Mitchell further justifies his 
application of the theory by pointing to the movement in 
business organization from hierarchical to flatter 
organizational structures. The latter allow for more structural 
holes, because more managers report to the CEO, and thus 
more possibilities of CEO or senior executive opportunism 
(depending upon who fills the holes). He thus argues that 
typical reforms aimed exclusively at enhancing the board’s 
monitoring ability miss structural holes below the board as an 
important determinant of the corporate scandals. 
Although she was not a presenter at the conference, 
Professor of Philosophy Margaret Gilbert offers her views on 
the subject of corporate misbehavior in her paper Corporate 
Misbehavior and Corporate Values. As is customary in 
philosophical discourse, she gives precision to the concepts of 
group beliefs and group values, to distinguish them from their 
personal counterparts and to emphasize their strength 
(through a group member’s “commitment” to these beliefs and 
values) in crowding out conflicting individual beliefs and 
values. As she argues, “collective beliefs, values and goals are 
apt to induce people to disguise their contrary opinions—
however morally perspicacious—and to abstain from any active 
effort at their diffusion.” She joins with Professors Treviño and 
Tyler in asserting that it is critical to prevent corporate 
scandals for a firm to make moral values a part of its group 
beliefs. 
These articles clearly fulfill the goal of our conference of 
promoting new avenues of scholarly research on business firms 
and their pathologies. At the end of the conference, moreover, 
its participants met in a planning session to discuss ways of 
promoting research between organizational theorists and social 
psychologists, on the one hand, and corporate scholars, on the 
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other. This session led to the following projects: In the near 
future, there will be launched an electronic journal to be 
published by the Social Science Research Network entitled 
“Business Associations and Financial Law: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal,” which is designed to circulate 
papers in the business law area with a social science focus. 
Participants in the conference as well as other interested 
scholars are also working to create a model interdisciplinary 
course with readings from the social sciences and the law. We 
hope that these will be the first of many collaborative projects 
between social scientists and legal scholars, and that the 
projects may improve legal policy-making on the regulation of 
corporations and financial institutions. 
 
